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Abstract
While statistics and machine learning offers numerous methods for ensuring generaliza-
tion, these methods often fail in the presence of adaptivity—the common practice in which
the choice of analysis depends on previous interactions with the same dataset. A recent line
of work has introduced powerful, general purpose algorithms that ensure post hoc general-
ization (also called robust or post-selection generalization), which says that, given the output
of the algorithm, it is hard to find any statistic for which the data differs significantly from
the population it came from.
In this work we show several limitations on the power of algorithms satisfying post
hoc generalization. First, we show a tight lower bound on the error of any algorithm that
satisfies post hoc generalization and answers adaptively chosen statistical queries, showing
a strong barrier to progress in post selection data analysis. Second, we show that post hoc
generalization is not closed under composition, despite many examples of such algorithms
exhibiting strong composition properties.
1 Introduction
Consider a dataset X consisting of n independent samples from some unknown popula-
tion P . How can we ensure that the conclusions drawn from X generalize to the population
P ? Despite decades of research in statistics and machine learning on methods for ensuring
generalization, there is an increased recognition that many scientific findings generalize poorly
(e.g. Ioannidis [21]). While there are many reasons a conclusion might fail to generalize, one
that is receiving increasing attention is adaptivity—when the choice of method for analyzing the
dataset depends on previous interactions with the same dataset.
Adaptivity can arise frommany common practices, such as exploratory data analysis, using
the same data set for feature selection and regression, and the re-use of datasets across research
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projects. Unfortunately, adaptivity invalidates traditional methods for ensuring generalization
and statistical validity, which assume that the method is selected independently of the data.
The misinterpretation of adaptively selected results has even been blamed for a “statistical
crisis” in empirical science [18].
Once methods are selected adaptively, data analysts must take selection into account when
interpreting results—a problem the statistics literature refers to as selective inference, or post-
selection inference. Several approaches have been devised for statistical inference after selection.
These generally require conditional inference algorithms, or uniform convergence arguments,
tailored to a particular sequence of analyses. Perhaps more fundamentally, this line of work
is not prescriptive, in that it does not provide design principles that guide the selection of a
sequence of analyses to improve later inference. We discuss that work further in Section 1.2.
A recent line of work initiated by Dwork et al. [9] posed the question: Can we design
general-purpose algorithms for ensuring generalization in the presence of adaptivity, together
with guarantees on their accuracy? These works identified properties of an algorithm that
ensure good generalization of queries selected based on its output, including differential pri-
vacy [9, 1], information-theoretic measures [8, 28, 27, 34], and compression [6]. They also iden-
tified many powerful general-purpose algorithms satisfying these properties, leading to algo-
rithms for post-selection data analysis with greater statistical power than all previously known
approaches.
Each of the aforementioned properties give incomparable generalization guarantees, and
allow for qualitatively different types of algorithms. The common thread in each of these ap-
proaches is to establish a notion of post hoc generalization (first named robust generalization by
Cummings et al. [6]). Informally, an algorithmM satisfies post hoc generalization if there is no
way, given only the output ofM(X), to identify any statistical query [22] such that the value of
that query on the dataset is significantly different from its answer on the whole population.1
More formally: a statistical query (or linear functional) is defined by a function q : X → [−1,1],
where X is the set of possible data points. The query’s empirical mean on a data set X is its av-
erage over the points in X, i.e., q(X) = 1n
∑
i q(Xi). Given a distribution P (called the population)
on X , the query’s population mean is q(P ) = E
X∼P
[X], the expectation of q on a fresh sample from
P .
Definition 1.1 (Post Hoc Generalization [6]). An algorithmM : X n → Y satisfies (ε,δ)-post hoc
generalization if for every distribution P over X and every algorithm A that outputs a bounded
function q : X → [−1,1], if X ∼ P ⊗n,Y ∼M(X), and q ∼ A(Y ), then
P [|q(P )− q(X)| > ε] ≤ δ,
where q(P ) = E [q(X)] and q(X) = 1n
∑
i q(Xi), and the probability is over the sampling of X and
any randomness ofM and A.
We phrase the definition as a tail bound on the post hoc generalization error, but one could
also cast the definition in terms of the generalization error’s moments (e.g. mean squared error).
For the purpose of proving asymptotic lower bounds, the definition we use is more general.
1The definition extends seamlessly to richer classes of statistics, but we specialize to these queries for concrete-
ness. That our negative results hold for such a simple class of queries only makes our results stronger.
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Post hoc generalization is easily satisfied whenever n is large enough to ensure uniform
convergence for the class of statistical queries. However, uniform convergence is only satisfied
in the unrealistic regime where n is much larger than |X |. Algorithms that satisfy post hoc
generalization are interesting in the realistic regime where there will exist queries q for which
q(P ) and q(X) are far, but these queries cannot be found.
Since all existing general-purpose algorithms for post-selection data analysis are analyzed
via post hoc generalization, it is crucial to understand what we can achieve with algorithms
satisfying post hoc generalization. This work shows two types of strong limitations on post
hoc generalization:
• We show new, almost tight limits on the accuracy of any post hoc generalizing algorithm
for estimating the answers to adaptively chosen statistical queries.
• We show that the composition of algorithms satisfying post hoc generalization does not
always satisfy post hoc generalization.
Our results identify natural barriers to progress in this area, and highlight important challenges
for future research on post-selection data analysis.
1.1 Our Results
1.1.1 Sample Complexity Bounds for Statistical Queries
Our first contribution is a strong new lower bound on any algorithm that answers a se-
quence of adaptively chosen statistical queries while satisfying post hoc generalization. State-
of-the-art algorithms for this problem do satisfy post hoc generalization, thus our lower bound
shows that improving on the state of the art would require a fundamentally different analysis
paradigm.
Dwork et al. [9] were the first to study the sample size required to answer adaptive statistical
queries; a recent line of work deepened the study of their model [1, 19, 29, 6, 27, 14, 15]. In
the model of, there is an underlying distribution P on a set X that an analyst would like to
study. An algorithm M holds a sample X ∼ P ⊗n, receives statistical queries q, and returns
accurate answers a such that a ≈ q(P ). To model adaptivity, consider a data analystA that issues
a sequence of queries q1, . . . ,qk where each query qj may depend on the answers a1, . . . ,aj−1
given by the algorithm in response to previous queries. Our goal is to design mechanismsM
that answer a sequence of k queries selected by an arbitrary (possibly adversarial) analyst at a
desired accuracy ε using as small a sample size n as possible.
The simplest algorithmM would return the empirical mean qj (X) = 1n
∑
i q
j (Xi) in response
to each query. One can show that this algorithm answers each query to within ±ε if n ≥
O˜(k/ε2).2 Surprisingly, we can improve the sample complexity to n ≥ O˜(√k/ε2)—a quadratic
improvement in k—by returning q(X) perturbedwith carefully calibrated noise [9, 1]. The anal-
ysis of this approach relies on post hoc generalization: one can show that no matter how the
2Formally, in order to rule out pathological queries, this sample-complexity guarantee applies only if we round
the empirical mean to some suitable precision ±1/poly(n).
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analyst selects queries, each query will satisfy q(P ) ≈ q(X)with high probability. The noise dis-
tribution also ensures that the difference between each answer a and the empirical mean q(X),
hence a ≈ q(P ).
Our main result shows that the sample complexity n = O˜(
√
k/ε2) is essentially optimal for
any algorithm that uses the framework of post hoc generalization. Our construction refines the
techniques in Hardt and Ullman [19] and Steinke and Ullman [29]—which yield a lower bound
of n =Ω(
√
k) for ε = 1/3.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). IfM takes a sample of size n, satisfies (ε,δ)-post hoc generalization, and for
every distribution P over X = {±1}k+O(log(n/ε)) and every data analyst A who asks k statistical queries,
P
[
∃j ∈ [k], |qj (P )− a| > ε
]
≤ δ
(where the probability is taken over X ∼ P ⊗n and the coins ofM and A), then n =Ω(√k/ε2).3
The dimensionality of X required in our result is at least as large as k; that dependence
is essentially necessary. Indeed, if the support of the distribution is {±1}d , then there is an
algorithmM that takes a sample of size just O˜(√d log(k)/ε3) [9, 1], so the conclusion is simply
false if d ≪ k. Even when d ≪ k, the aforementioned algorithms require running time at least
2d per query. [19, 29] also showed that any polynomial time algorithm that answers k queries to
constant error requires n = Ω(
√
k). We improve this result to have the optimal dependence on
ε.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). Assume pseudorandom generators exist and let c > 0 be any constant. IfM
takes a sample of size n, has polynomial running time, satisfies (ε,δ)-post hoc generalization, and for
every distribution P over X = {±1}kc+O(log(n/ε)) and every data analyst A who asks k statistical queries,
P
[
∃j ∈ [k], |qj (P )− a| > ε
]
≤ δ,
then n =Ω(
√
k/ε2), where the probability is taken over X ∼ P ⊗n and the coins ofM and A.
1.1.2 Negative Results for Composition
One of the motivations for studying post hoc generalization is to allow for exploratory
data analysis and dataset re-use. In these settings, the same dataset may be analyzed by many
different algorithms, each satisfying post hoc generalization. Thus it is important to understand
whether the composition of these algorithms also satisfies post hoc generalization. We show that
this is not always the case.
Theorem 1.4. For every n ∈N there is a collection of ℓ = O(logn) algorithmsM1, . . . ,Mℓ that take n
samples from a distribution over X = {0,1}O(logn) such that
3Independently, Wang [32] proved a quantitatively similar bound to Theorem 1.2. However, Wang’s lower
bound assumes that the algorithm M can see only the empirical mean q(X) of each query, and not the raw data
X . Their bound also applies for a slightly different (though closely related) class of statistics, where all possible
query values are jointly Gaussian.
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1. for every δ > 0 and for ε = O(
√
log(n/δ)
n.999
), each of these algorithms satisfies (ε,δ)-post hoc general-
ization, but
2. the composition (M1, . . . ,Mℓ) does not satisfy (1.999, .999)-post hoc generalization.
By standard anti-concentration results, no algorithm satisfies (ε,δ)-post hoc generalization
for ε = o(
√
log(1/δ)/n). On the other hand, every algorithm trivially satisfies (2,0)- and (0,1)-
post-hoc generalization. Thus, Theorem 1.4 states that there is a set of O(logn) algorithms that
have almost optimal post hoc generalization, but whose composition does not have any non-
trivial post hoc generalization. Certain subclasses of post hoc generalizing algorithms—such as
differential privacy [7]—do satisfy composition where the parameters ε,δ grow at worst linearly
in ℓ. In contrast, for arbitrary post hoc generalization, ε,δ can growwith 2Ω(ℓ). Our results give
additional motivation to studying subclasses that do compose.
We first consider a relaxed notion of computational post hoc generalization, for which we show
that composition can fail even for just two algorithms. Informally, computational post hoc
generalization requires that Definition 1.1 hold when the analyst A runs in polynomial time.
Theorem 1.5. Assume pseudorandom generators exist. For every n ∈ N there are two algorithms
M1,M2 that take n samples from a distribution over X = {0,1}O(logn) such that
1. for every δ > n−O(1) and for ε = O(
√
log(n/δ)
n.999
), both algorithms satisfy (ε,δ)-computational post
hoc generalization, but
2. the composition (M1,M2) is not (1.999, .999)-computationally post hoc generalizing.
We prove the information-theoretic result (Theorem 1.4) in Section 4. Due to space restric-
tions, we defer the computational result (Theorem 1.5) to the full version of this work.
1.2 Related Work
In addition to the upper and lower bounds mentioned above for adaptive linear queries, a
number of works have explored variants of the model, notably the models of jointly Gaussian
queries [28, 33, 32] and a Bayesian model with symmetric information [12, 13].
In the statistics literature, work on selective inference dates at least to the works of Freed-
man and Freedman [17], Hurvich and Tsai [20], and Po¨tscher [26]. The last decade or so has
seen a resurgence of interest, for example in [23, 24, 11, 16, 31, 2, 4] (this list is necessarily incom-
plete). One line of work due to Berk et al. [2] and Buja et al. [4] provides uniform validity results
for all analyses in a particular classes. As wementioned above, uniform convergence is not pos-
sible in many settings without prohibitively large sample sizes. Another line of work looks at
selective inference by explicity conditioning on the sequence of previous query answers (see Bi
et al. [3] for a high-level summary of the approach). Explicit conditioning has the advantage
of optimality in several contexts, but requires formulating a prior over possible distributions,
and can be computationally infeasible. Perhaps most problematically, the work we are aware
of along these lines is more “descriptive” than “prescriptive,” providing no estimates of power
or accuracy before the execution of an experiment, and thus no guidance on the optimal design
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of the experiment. Understanding the connections between that line of work and the work on
which we build directly remains an intriguing open problem.
While our work considers biases arising from adaptive analysis of iid data, a recent work of
Nie et al. [25] investigates the bias introduced by adaptive sampling of data. These questions
have similar motivation, but are technically orthogonal.
2 Lower Bounds for Statistical Queries
2.1 Post Hoc Generalization for Adaptive Statistical Queries
We are interested in the ability of interactive algorithms satisfying post hoc generalization
to answer a sequence of statistical queries. Definition 1.1 applies to such algorithms via the
following experiment.
Algorithm 1: AQX ,n,k[M⇌A]
A chooses a distribution P over X
X ∼ P ⊗n and X is given toM (but not to A)
For j = 1, . . . , k
A outputs a statistical query qj (possibly depending on q1,a1, . . . ,qj−1,aj−1)
M(X) outputs aj
Definition 2.1. An algorithmM is (ε,δ)-post hoc generalizing for k adaptive queries over X given n
samples if for every adversary A,
P
AQX ,n,k [M⇌A]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj (X)− qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε] ≤ δ.
Definition 2.2. An algorithm M is (ε,δ)-accurate for k adaptive queries over X given n samples if
for every adversary A,
P
AQX ,n,k [M⇌A]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣aj − qj (P )∣∣∣ > ε] ≤ δ.
2.2 A Lower Bound for Natural Algorithms
Webeginwith an information-theoretic lower bound for a class of algorithmsM that we call
natural algorithms. These are algorithms that can only evaluate the query on the sample points
they are given. That is, an algorithm M is natural if, when given a sample X = (X1, . . . ,Xn)
and a statistical query q : X → [−1,1], the algorithm M returns an answer a that is a function
only of (q(X1), . . . ,q(Xn)). In particular, it cannot evaluate q on data points of its choice. Many
algorithms in the literature have this property. Formally, we define natural algorithms via the
game NAQX ,n,k[M⇌A]. This game is identical to AQX ,n,k[M⇌A] except that whenA outputs
qj ,M does not receive all of qj , but instead receives only qjX = (qj (X1), . . . ,qj (Xn)).
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Algorithm 2: NAQX ,n,k[M⇌A]
A chooses a distribution P over X
X ∼ P ⊗n and X is given toM (but not to A)
For j = 1, . . . , k
A outputs a statistical query qj : X → [−1,1] (possibly depending on
q1,a1, . . . ,qj−1,aj−1)
M receives qjX = (qj (X1), . . . ,qj (Xn))
M outputs aj (possibly depending on q1X ,a1, . . . ,q
j−1
X ,a
j )
Theorem 2.3 (Lower Bound for Natural Algorithms). There is an adversary ANAQ such that for
every natural algorithmM, and for universe size N = 8n/ε, if
P
NAQ[N ],n,k [M⇌ANAQ]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj (X)− qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε∨∣∣∣aj − qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε] ≤ 1100
then n =Ω(
√
k/ε2)
The proof uses the analyst ANAQ described in Algorithm 3. For notational convenience,
ANAQ actually asks k +1 queries, but this does not affect the final result.
Algorithm 3: ANAQ
Parameters: sample size n, universe size N = 8nε , number of queries k, target accuracy ε
Let P ← U[N ], A1 ← [N ], and τ← 9ε
√
2k log(96ε ) + 1
For j ∈ [k]
Sample pj ∼ U[0,1]
For i ∈ [N ]
Sample q˜
j
i ∼ Ber(pj ) and let qj(i)←
 q˜
j
i i < A
j
0 i ∈ Aj
Ask query qj and receive answer aj
For i ∈ [N ]
Let z
j
i ←
 trunc3ε(aj − pj ) · (q
j
i − pj ) i < Aj
0 i ∈ Aj
where trunc3ε(x) takes x ∈ R and returns the nearest point in [−3ε,3ε] to x.
Let Aj+1 ←
{
i ∈ [N ] :
∣∣∣∣∑jℓ=1 zℓi
∣∣∣∣ > τ − 1} (N.B. By construction, Aj ⊆ Aj+1.)
For i ∈ [N ]
Define zi ←
∑k
j=1 z
j
i and q
∗
i ← ziτ
Let q∗ : [N ]→ [−1,1] be defined by q∗(i)← q∗i
In order to prove Theorem 2.3, it suffices to prove that either the answer aj to one of the
initial queries qj fails to be accurate (in which caseM is not accurate, or that the final query q∗
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gives significantly different answers on X and P (in which caseM is not robustly generalizing).
Formally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. For an appropriate choice of k = Θ(ε4n2) and n, 1ε sufficiently large, for any natural
M, with probability at least 2/3, either
1. ∃j ∈ [k] |aj − qj (P )| > ε, or
2. q∗(X)− q∗(P ) > ε
where the probability is taken over the game NAQX ,n,k[M⇌ANAQ]
We prove Proposition 2.4 using a series of claims. The first claim states that none of the
values zi are ever too large in absolute value, which follows immediately from the definition of
the set Aj and the fact that each term z
j
i is bounded.
Claim 2.5. For every i ∈ [N ], |zi | ≤ τ.
Proof. Note that for every i, j, we have |zji | ≤ 1. Now, if i ∈ Ak then by definition
∑k−1
ℓ=1 z
ℓ
i (≤ τ − 1,
and the claim follows. Otherwise, suppose j +1 is the minimal value such that i < Aj+1, then
|zi | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
j∑
ℓ=1
zℓi +
k∑
ℓ=j+1
zℓi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
j−1∑
ℓ=1
zℓi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ |z
j
i |+0 ≤ τ − 1+1+0 = τ
The next claim states that, no matter how the mechanism answers, very few of the items
not in the sample get “accused” of membership, that is, included in the set Aj .
Claim 2.6 (Few Accusations). Pr(|Ak \X | ≤ εN/8) ≥ 1− e−Ω(εn).
Proof. Fix the biases p1, ...,pk as well as the all the information visibile to the mechanism (the
query values {qji : i ∈ X,j ∈ [k]}, as well as the answers a1, ...,ak ). We prove that the probability
of F is high conditioned on any setting of these variables.
The main observation is that, once we condition on the biases pj , the query values at {qji : i <
X,j ∈ [k]} are independent with qji ∼ Ber(pj ). This is true becauseM is a natural algorithm (so
it sees only the query values for points in X) and, more subtly, because the analyst’s decisions
about how to sample the pj ’s, and which points in X to include in the sets Aj , are independent
of the query values outside of X. By the principle of deferred decisions, we may thus think
of the query values {qji : i < X,j ∈ [k]} as selected after the interaction with the mechanism is
complete.
Fix i < X. For every j ∈ [k] and i < X, we have
E
[
z
j
i
]
= E
[
trunc3ε(a
j − pj ) · (qji − pj )
]
=E
[
trunc3ε(a
j − pj )
]
·E
[
q
j
i − pj
]
= 0.
By linearity of expectation, we also have E [zi] = E
[∑k
j=1 z
j
i
]
= 0.
Next, note that |zji | ≤ 3ε, since trunc3ε(aj −pj ) ∈ [−3ε,3ε] and q
j
i −pj ∈ [0,1]. The terms z
j
i are
not independent, since if a partial sum
∑ℓ
j=1 z
j
i ever exceeds τ, then subsequent values z
j
i for
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j > ℓ will be set to 0. However, we may consider a related sequence given by sums of the terms
z˜
j
i = trunc3ε(a
j − pj ) · (q˜ji − pj ) (the difference from z
j
i is that we use values q˜
j
i Ber(p
j ) regardless
of whether item i is in Aj ). Once we have conditioned on the biases and mechanism’s outputs,∑k
j=1 z˜i is a sum of bounded independent random variables. By Hoeffding’s Inequality, the sum
is bounded O(ε
√
k log(1/ε) with high probability, for every i < X
P

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
j=1
z˜
j
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > ε
√
18k ln
(
96
ε
) ≤ ε48 .
By Etemadi’s Inequality, a related bound holds uniformly over all the intermediate sums:
∀i < X P

∃ℓ ∈ [k] :
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ℓ∑
j=1
z˜ℓi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 3ε
√
18k ln
(
96
ε
)
︸              ︷︷              ︸
τ−1

≤ 3 ·P

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
j=1
z˜
j
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > ε
√
18k ln
(
96
ε
) ≤ ε16
Finally, notice that by construction, the real scores z
j
i are all set to 0 when an item is added to
Aj , so the sets Aj are nested (Aj ⊆ Aj+1), and a bound on partial sums of the z˜ji applies equally
well to the partial sums of the z
j
i . Thus,
∀i < X P
∃ℓ ∈ [k] :
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ℓ∑
j=1
zℓi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > τ − 1
 ≤ ε16
Now, the scores zi are independent across players (again, because we have fixed the biases
pj and the mechanism’s outputs). We can bound the probability that more than εN4 elements i
are “accused” over the course of the algorithm using Chernoff’s bound:
P
[
|Ak \X | > ε8N
]
≤ e−εN/64 ≤ e−Ω(n)
The claim now follows by averaging over all of the choices we fixed.
The next claim states that the sum of the scores over all i not in the sample is small.
Claim 2.7. With probability at least 99100 ,
∑
i∈[N ]\X zi =O(ε
√
Nk).
Proof. Fix a choice of (p1, . . . ,pk) ∈ [0,1]k , the in-sample query values (q1X , . . . ,qkX ) ∈ {0,1}n×k , and
the answers (a1, . . . ,ak) ∈ [0,1]k. Conditioned on these, the values zi for i < X are indepen-
dent and identically distributed. They have expectation 0 (see the proof of Claim 2.6) and
are bounded by τ (by Claim 2.5). By Hoeffding’s inequality, with probability at least 99100∑
i∈[N ]\X zi = O(τ
√
N ) = O(ε
√
Nk) as desired. The claim now follows by averaging over all
of the choices we fixed.
Claim 2.8. There exists c > 0 such that, for all sufficiently small ε and sufficiently large n, with proba-
bility at least 99100 , either
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1. ∃j ∈ [k] : |aj − qj(P )| > ε (large error), or
2.
∑
i∈[N ] zi ≥ ck (high scores in sample).
The proof of Claim 2.8 relies on the following key lemma. The lemma has appeared in
various forms [29, 10, 30]; the form we use is [5, Lemma 3.6] (rescaled from {−1,+1} to {0,1}).
Lemma 2.9 (Fingerprinting Lemma). Let f : {0,1}m → [0,1] be arbitrary. Sample p ∼ U[0,1] and
sample x1, . . . ,xm ∼ Ber(p) independently. Then
E
(f (x)− p) ·
∑
i∈[m]
(xi − p) +
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣f (x)−
1
m
∑
i∈[m]
xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ≥ 112 .
Proof of Claim 2.8. To make use of the fingerprinting lemma, we consider a variant of Algo-
rithm 3 that does not truncate the quantity aj − pj to the range ±2ǫ when computing the score
z
j
i for each element i. Specifically, we consider scores based on the quantities
zˆ
j
i =
(a
j − pj ) · (qji − pj ) if i < Aj ,
0 if i ∈ Aj ; and zˆi =
k∑
j=1
zˆ
j
i .
We prove two main statements: first, that these untruncated scores are equal to the trun-
cated ones with high probability as long as the mechanism’s answers are accurate. Second, that
the expected sum of the untruncated scores is large. This gives us the desired final statement.
To relate the truncated and untruncated scores, consider the following three key events:
1. (“Few accusations”): Let F the event that, at every round j, set of “accused” items outside
of the sample is small: |Ak \X | ≤ εN/8. Since the Aj are nested, event F implies the same
condition for all j in [k].
2. (“Low population error”): LetG be the event that at every round j ∈ [k], the mechanism’s
anwer satisfies |aj − pj | ≤ 3ε.
3. (“Representative queries”): Let H be the event that |q˜j (P )− pj | ≤ ε for all rounds j ∈ [k]—
that is, each query’s population average is close to the corresponding sampling bias pj .
Sub-Claim 2.10. Conditioned on F ∩G ∩H , the truncated and untruncated scores are equal. Specifi-
cally, |aj − pj | ≤ 3ε for all j ∈ [k].
Proof. We can bound the difference |aj − pj | via the triangle inequality:
|aj − pj | ≤ |aj − qj(P )|+ |qj (P )− q˜j(P )|+ |q˜j (P )− pj | .
The first term is the mechanism’s sample error (bounded when G occurs). The second is the
distortion of the sample mean introduced by setting the query values of i ∈ Aj to 0. This
distortion is at most |Aj |/N . When F occurs, Aj has size at most |X |+ |Aj \X | ≤ n+ εN/8 = εN/4,
so the second term is at most ε/4. Finally, the last term is bounded by ε when H occurs, by
definition. The three terms add to at most 3ε when F, G, and H all occur.
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We can bound the probability ofH via a Chernoff bound: The probability of that a binomial
random variable deviates from its mean by εN is at most 2exp(−ε2N/3).
The technical core of the proof is the use of the fingerprinting lemma to analyze the differ-
ence D between the sum of untruncated scores and the summed population errors:
D :=
N∑
i=1
z˜i −
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣aj − qj(P )∣∣∣− kE [ |Aj |
N−|Aj |
]
Sub-Claim 2.11. E [D] =Ω(k)
Proof. We show that for each round j, the expected sum of scores for that round
∑
i z˜
j
i is at least
1/12−E
[
|aj − qj (P )| − |Aj |
N−|Aj |
]
. This is true even when we condition on all the random choices
and communication in rounds 1 through j − 1. Adding up these expectations over all rounds
gives the desired expectation bound for D.
First, note that summing z
j
i over all elements i ∈ [N ] is the same as summing over that
round’s unaccused elements i ∈ [N ] \Aj (since z˜ji = 0 for i ∈ Aj ). Thus,
N∑
i=1
z˜
j
i =
∑
i∈[N ]\Aj
z˜
j
i = (a
j − pj )
∑
i∈[N ]\Aj
(q
j
i − pj ) .
We can now apply the Fingerprinting Lemma, with m = N − |Aj |, p = pj , xi = q˜ji for i < Aj , and
f ((xi)i<Aj ) = a
j (note that f depends implicitly on Aj , but since we condition on the outcome of
previous rounds, we may take Aj as fixed for round j). We obtain
E

N∑
i=1
z˜
j
i
 ≥ 112 −E

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣aj −
1
N − |Aj | ·
∑
i<Aj
q
j
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣

Now the difference between 1
N−|Aj |
∑
i<Aj q
j
i and the actual population mean
1
N
∑N
i=1 q
j
i is at most
N · ( 1N − 1N−|Aj | ) =
|Aj |
N−|Aj | . Thus we can upper-bound the term inside the right-hand side expecta-
tion above by |aj − qj (P )|+ |Aj |
N−|Aj | .
A direct corollary of Sub-Claim 2.11 is that there is a constant c′ > 0 such that, with proba-
bility at least 199/200,D ≥ c′k. Let’s call that event I .
Conditioned on F ∩G ∩H , we know that each z˜i equals the real score zi (by the first sub-
claim above), that |aj − qj (P )| ≤ 3ε for each j, and that |Ak | ≤ εN/8. If we also consider the
intersection with I , then we have D ≥ c′k − 3kε − k ε/81−ε/8 ≥ k(c′ − 4ε) (for sufficiently small ε).
By a union bound, the probability of ¬(F ∩H ∩ I ) is at most 1/200+ exp(−Ω(ε2n)) ≤ 1/100 (for
sufficiently large n). Thus we get P
[
(¬G) or
(∑N
i=1 zi ≥ ck
)]
≥ 99100 , where c = c′ − 4ε is positive
for sufficiently small ε. This completes the proof of Claim 2.8.
To complete the proof of the proposition, suppose that |aj −qj (P )| ≤ ε for every j, so that we
can assume
∑
i∈X zi = Ω(k). Then, we can show that, when n is sufficiently large and k & ε4n2,
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the final query q∗ will violate robust generalization. The following calculation shows that for
the query q∗ that we defined, q∗(X)− q∗(P ) =Θ(ε√k).
q∗(X)− q∗(P ) = 1
n
∑
i∈X
zi
τ
− 1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
zi
τ
=
(
1
nτ
− 1
Nτ
)∑
i∈X
zi − 1Nτ
∑
i∈[N ]\X
zi
=
1
2nτ
∑
i∈X
zi − 1Nτ
∑
i∈[N ]\X
zi (N =
8n
ε ≥ 2n)
=
1
2nτ
·Ω(k)− 1
Nτ
·O(ε
√
Nk) (Claims 2.7 and 2.8)
=Ω
(
k
nε
√
k
)
−O
(
ε
√
Nk
Nε
√
k
)
=Ω
(√
k
nε
)
−O
(
1√
N
)
(τ =Θ(ε
√
k))
Now, we choose an appropriate k = Θ(ε4n2) we will have that q∗(X)− q∗(P ) > ε. By this choice
of k, the first term in the final line above will be at least 2ε. Also, we have N ≥ n = Θ(√k/ε2),
so when k is larger than some absolute constant, the O(1/
√
N ) term in the final line above is
Θ(ε/ 4
√
k) ≤ ε. Thus, by Claims 2.7 and 2.8, either M fails to be accurate, so that ∃j ∈ [k] |aj −
qj (P )| > ε, or we find a query q∗ such that q∗(X)− q∗(P ) > ε.
3 Lower Bounds for General Algorithms
In this section we show how to “lift” our lower bounds for natural oracles to arbitrary
algorithms using techniques from [19].
3.1 Information-Theoretic Lower Bounds via RandomMasks
We prove information-theoretic lower bounds by constructing the following transformation
from an adversary that defeats all natural algorithms to an adversary (for a much a larger
universe) that defeats all algorithms. The main idea of the reduction is to use random masks4
to hide information about the evaluation of the queries at points outside of the dataset. Since
the algorithm does not obtain any information about the evaluation of the queries on points
outside of its dataset, it is effectively forced to behave like a natural algorithm.
We now prove the following lemma, which states that if no natural algorithm can be ro-
bustly generalizing and accurate against ANAQ, then no algorithm of any kind can be robustly
generalizing and accurate against AAQ.
Lemma 3.1. For every algorithm M, and every adversary ANAQ for natural algorithms given as an
4In cryptographic terminology, a one-time pad.
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Algorithm 4: AAQ
Parameters: sample size n, universe size N = 8nε , number of queries k, target accuracy ε.
Oracle: an adversary ANAQ for natural algorithms with sample size n, universe size N ,
number of queries k, target accuracy ε.
Let X = {(i,y)}i∈[N ],y∈{±1}k
For i ∈ [N ]
Choosemi = (m
1
i , . . . ,m
k
i ) ∼ U({±1}k)
Let P be the uniform distribution over pairs (i,mi ) for i ∈ [N ]
For j ∈ [k]
Receive the query qˆj : [N ]→ [±1] from ANAQ
Form the query qj (i,y) = yj ⊕mji ⊕ qˆj(i) (NB: qj (i,mi ) = qˆj (i))
Send the query qj toM and receive the answer aj
Send the answer aj to ANAQ
oracle to AAQ, the adversary AAQ satisfies
P
AQ[N ]×{±1}k ,n,k [M⇌AAQ]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj (X)− qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε∨∣∣∣aj − qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε]
≥ min
naturalM
(
P
NAQ[N ],n,k [M⇌ANAQ]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj (X)− qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε∨∣∣∣aj − qj(P ) > ε∣∣∣]
)
The following corollary is immediate by combining Theorem 2.3 with Lemma 3.1.
Corollary 3.2. There is an adversary AAQ such that for every algorithmM, if
P
AQ[N ]×{±1}k ,n,k [M⇌AAQ]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj (X)− qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε∨∣∣∣aj − qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε] ≥ .01
then n =Ω(
√
k/ε2).
We now return to proving Lemma 3.1
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Fix any algorithmM. We claim that there is an algorithmMNAQ such that
P
NAQ[N ],n,k [MNAQ⇌ANAQ]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj (X)− qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε∨∣∣∣aj − qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε]
= P
AQ[N ]×{±1}k ,n,k [M⇌AAQ]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj (X)− qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε∨∣∣∣aj − qj(P )∣∣∣ > ε] (1)
We construct the algorithm as follows
Observe that, by construction, that if xˆ1, . . . , xˆn are independent samples from the uniform
distribution over [N ], then x1, . . . ,xn are independent samples from the uniform distribution
over pairs (i,mi ) for uniformly random m1, . . . ,mN ∈ {±1}k . Thus, the distribution of X is the
same as the distribution constructed by AAQ.
By construction, the distribution of the evaluations of the queries q1, . . . ,qk on points of the
form (i,y) for i ∈ Xˆ are identical to the distribution of those values in AAQ. The only thing that
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Algorithm 5:MNAQ
Input: a sample Xˆ = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn) ∈ [N ]n
Oracle: an algorithmM
For i ∈ [N ]
Choosemi = (m
1
i , . . . ,m
k
i ) ∼ U({±1}k)
For i ∈ [n]
Let xi = (xˆi ,mxˆi )
Let X = (x1, . . . ,xn)
For j ∈ [k]
Receive the (partial) query qˆj = (qˆ
j
xˆ1
, . . . , qˆ
j
xˆn
) from the adversary
Form the query
qj (i,y) =
 y
j ⊕mji ⊕ qˆ
j
i i ∈ Xˆ
yj ⊕mji ⊕ 0 i < Xˆ
RunM(X) on the query qj and receive the answer aj
Return the answer aˆj = aj
require verification is that the distribution of the evaluations of the queries q1, . . . ,qk on points of
the form (i,y) for i < Xˆ are also identical to the distribution of those values in AAQ. Now, since
m1, . . . ,mN are jointly uniformly random and independent of qˆ
1, . . . , qˆk , the joint distribution of
the values m
j
i ⊕ qˆ
j
i for i < Xˆ and j ∈ [k] is identical to that of m
j
i ⊕ 0. Since these values are
enough to determine the evaluation of the queries q1, . . . ,qk on all points of the form (i,y) for
i < Xˆ, when conditioned on X, the distribution of the queries q1, . . . ,qk given toM is identical
to those constructed byAAQ. Since the view ofMwhen interacting withAAQ is identical to the
view ofMNAQ when interacting with ANAQ, we must have (1).
3.2 Computational Lower Bounds via PseudorandomMasks
The drawback of the random masking procedure is that, since the length of the random
mask is equal to the number of queries, and this randommask is the data given to the algorithm,
the dimension of the data must be at least equal to the number of queries. However, using cryp-
tographic constructions, we can use a short seed to generate a large number of bits that appear
random to any computationally efficient algorithm, thereby obtaining the same masking effect
against computationally bounded adversaries, but with lower dimensional data.
First, we recall the definition of a pseudorandom generator
Definition 3.3. A functions G : {±1}ℓ → {±1}k is an (ℓ,k,γ,T )-pseudorandom generator if for every
algorithmM running in time T (i.e. a circuit of size T )
|P [M(G(Uℓ))]−P [M(Uk)]| ≤ γ
where Uℓ and Uk denote the uniform distribution over {±1}ℓ and {±1}k , respectively
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Definition 3.3 is interesting when ℓ < k. When we say that M runs in time T , we mean
thatM is computed by a fixed program (e.g. a RAM or a Boolean circuit) whose running time
on all inputs x ∈ {±1}k is at most T . A standard assumption in cryptography is that for arbi-
trarily small c > 0, arbitrarily large C > 0, and every sufficiently large k ∈ N, there exists a
(kc , k,k−C , kC ). This is the assumption we make in the introduction when we assume pseudoran-
dom generators exist.
Remark 3.4. Definition 3.3 is non-uniform in that it defines pseudorandom generators with a fixed
output length k and adversaries with a fixed input length k. A more conventional definition would
define a family of pseudorandom generators {Gk : {±1}ℓ(k) → {±1}k} and uniform adversary (e.g. a
Turing machine) that takes an arbitrary input and has running time polynomial in the size of its input.
We could easily present our results using the latter definition, but we chose to use Definition 3.3 since it
is more concrete and corresponds more directly to our definition of post hoc selection.
A standard fact is that if G is a pseudorandom generator, then it is pseudorandom even if
we use it many times on independent random inputs.
Fact 3.5. If G : {±1}ℓ → {±1}k is a (ℓ,k,γ,T )-pseudorandom generator, then for every m, and everyM
running in time T ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P

M(G(Uℓ), . . . ,G(Uℓ)︸              ︷︷              ︸
m iid copies
)

−P
M(Uk , . . . ,Uk︸     ︷︷     ︸
m iid copies
)

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤O(mγ )
We’re now ready to state the reduction from computational efficient algorithms that answer
statistical queries to natural algorithms, which closely mimics the reductionAAQ from arbitrary
algorithms to natural algorithms. In the reduction we use G(s)j to denote the j-th bit of the
output of G(s).
Algorithm 6: ACAQ
Parameters: sample size n, universe size N = 8nε , number of queries k, target accuracy ε, a
pseudorandom generator G : {±1}ℓ → {±1}k
Oracle: an adversary ANAQ for natural algorithms with sample size n, universe size N ,
number of queries k, target accuracy ε.
Let X = {(i, z)}i∈[N ],z∈{±1}ℓ
For i ∈ [N ]
Choose si ∼ U({±1}ℓ)
Let P be the uniform distribution over pairs (i, si ) for i ∈ [N ]
For j ∈ [k]
Receive the query qˆj : [N ]→ [±1] from ANAQ
Form the query qj (i, z) = G(z)j ⊕G(si)j ⊕ qˆj (i) (NB: qj (i, si) = qˆj (i))
Send the query qj toM and receive the answer aj
Send the answer aj to ANAQ
We prove the following results about ACAQ.
15
Lemma 3.6. If there exists an (ℓ,k,γ,T )-pseudorandom generator, then for every time T algorithm M,
and every adversary ANAQ for natural algorithms given as an oracle to ACAQ, ACAQ satisfies
P
AQ[N ]×{±1}ℓ ,n,k [M⇌ACAQ]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj(X)− qj (P )∣∣∣ > ε∨∣∣∣aj − qj (P )∣∣∣ > ε]
≥ min
naturalM
(
P
NAQ[N ],n,k [M⇌ANAQ]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj(X)− qj (P )∣∣∣ > ε∨∣∣∣aj − qj(P ) > ε∣∣∣]
)
−O(nγ )
The following corollary is immediate by combining Theorem 2.3 with Lemma 3.6.
Corollary 3.7. If there exists an (ℓ,k,γ,T )-pseudorandom generator, then there is an adversary ACAQ
such that for every time T algorithmM, if
P
AQ[N ]×{±1}ℓ ,n,k [M⇌AAQ]
[
∃j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣qj(X)− qj (P )∣∣∣ > ε∨∣∣∣aj − qj (P )∣∣∣ > ε] ≥ .01−O(nγ )
then n =Ω(
√
k/ε2).
Proof of Lemma 3.6. The proof closely follows that of Lemma 3.1, but replacing the uniform ran-
domness of the masks mi with pseudorandomness of the masks G(si). That is, first we use
the pseudorandom property of G (Definition 3.3 and Fact 3.5) to argue that we can replace the
strings G(si) wth uniformly random strings mi , and if M is computationally efficient this re-
placement will only effect the probability of any event by a negl(k) term. At this point, since
the masks are uniformly random, the view of the algorithmwill be identical to their view when
interacting with AAQ, so we can reuse the proof of Lemma 3.1 as is.
4 Post Hoc Generalization Does Not Compose
In this section we prove that post hoc generalization is not closed under composition. We
prove two results of this form—information-theoretic (Section 4.1) and computation (Section 4).
4.1 Information-Theoretic Composition
Theorem 4.1. For every n ∈ N and every α > 0 there is a collection of ℓ = O( 1α logn) algorithms
M1, . . . ,Mℓ : ({0,1}5logn)n →Y such that
1. for every i = 1, . . . , ℓ and δ > 0,Mi satisfies (ε,δ)-post hoc generalization for ε =O(
√
log(n/δ)/n1−α),
but
2. the composition (M1, . . . ,Mℓ) is not
(
2− 2
n4
,1− 1
2n3
)
-post hoc generalizing.
The result is based on an algorithm that we call Encrypermute. Before proving Theorem 4.1,
we introduce Encrypermute and establish the main property that it satisfies.
The key facts about Encrypermute are as follows.
Claim 4.2. Let D be any distribution over ({0,1}d )n. Let D ∼ D, let X be a random permutation of D,
and let C ← Encrypermute(X). Then D and C are independent.
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Algorithm 7: Encrypermutek
Input: Parameter k, and a sample X = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) ∈ ({0,1}d )n for d = 5logn.
If X contains n distinct elements
Let π be the permutation that sorts (x1, . . . ,xk) and identify π with r ∈ {0,1, . . . , k!− 1}
Let α ∈ [0,1] be the largest number such that k ≥ nα and let t← αk/20 (NB: 2dt ≤ k!)
Identify (xk+1, . . . ,xk+t) ∈ ({0,1}d)t with a number m ∈ {0,1, . . . , k!− 1}
Return c =m+ r mod k!
Else
Return a random number c ∈ {0,1, . . . , k!− 1}
Proof. Fix a possible dataset ~y = (y1, . . . ,yn) ∈ ({0,1}d )n, and observe that if ~y does not contain n
distinct elements, then the output C is uniform on {0,1, . . . , k!− 1}. That is, for every such ~y and
for every choice of C = c we have P
[
C = c |D = ~y] = 1k! .
We now proceed assuming that ~y does contain n distinct elements, in which case we will
show that the output C is still uniform. Fix a possible output c ∈ {0,1, . . . , k! − 1}. Recall that S
is obtained by randomly permuting ~y, and let Xk+1, . . . ,Xk+t denote the elements in positions
k+1, . . . , k+t in X. We letM denote the numerical value of Xk+1, . . . ,Xk+t . Let R denote a random
variables taking value r in the algorithm, and observe that for every fixed value ofXk+1, . . . ,Xk+t ,
the order of the first k elements in X is still uniform, and hence, R is uniform. Then,
P
[
C = c |D = ~y] = P [R = c −M mod k! |D = ~y]
= E
~x|D=~y
[
P
[
R = c −M mod k! | ~y,~x]] = 1
k!
P
[
C = c |D = ~y] = P [R = c −M mod k! |D = ~y]
=
∑
~x=(xk+1,...,xk+t )
P
[
(Xk+1, . . . ,Xk+t) = ~x |D = ~y] ·Pr[R = c −M mod k! | ~y,~x]
=
∑
~x=(xk+1,...,xk+t )
Pr[(Xk+1, . . . ,Xk+t) = ~x |D = ~y] · 1k! =
1
k!
.
Overall, for every choice of ~y (whether containing n distinct elements or not) and for every
choice of C = c we have that P
[
C = c |D = ~y] = 1/k!. Therefore, for every choice of C = c,
P [C = c] = 1k! .
P [C = c] =
∑
~y
P
[
D = ~y
] ·P [C = c |D = ~y]
∑
~y
P
[
D = ~y
] · 1
k!
=
1
k!
.
So, for every ~y and c we have P
[
C = c |D = ~y] = 1k! = P [C = c], as desired.
Lemma 4.3. For every δ > 0 and 0 ≤ k ≤ n, Encrypermutek satisfies (ε,δ)-post hoc generalization for
ε =
√
2ln(2/δ)/n.
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Proof. Let d = 5logn and let P be a distribution over {0,1}d . LetA be any (possibly randomized)
algorithm that outputs a function q : {0,1}d → [−1,1]. Let D ∼ P ⊗n be n iid samples from P , let
X be a random permutation of D, let C ← Encrypermute(X), and let q←A(C). By Claim 4.2, C
and D are independent, and so q and D are independent. Therefore, by the Hoeffding bound,
P
|q(P )− q(X)| ≥
√
2ln(2/δ)
n
 ≤ δ.
As X is a permutation of D, for every such q we have E
z∼X
[q(z)] = E
z∼D
[q(z)]. Therefore,
P
|q(P )− q(X)| ≥
√
2ln(2/δ)
n
 ≤ δ.
showing that Encrypermute is indeed (ε,δ)-robustly generalizing.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Fix α ∈ (0,1), and let M1 denote the mechanism that takes a database of
size n and outputs the first nα elements of its sample. As M1 outputs a sublinear portion of
its input, it satisfies post hoc generalization with strong parameters. Specifically, by [6, Lemma
3.5],M1 is (ε,δ)-post hoc generalizing for
ε =O

√
log(n/δ)
n1−α

Now consider composing M1 with ℓ = O( 1α logn) copies of Encrypermute, with exponen-
tially growing choices for the parameter k1, . . . , kℓ , where
ki =
(
1+
α
20
)i
· nα
By Lemma 4.3, each of thesemechanisms satisfies post hoc generalization for ε =O(
√
log(1/δ)/n),
so this composition satisfies the assumptions of the theorem.
Let P be the uniform distribution over {0,1}d , where d = 5logn, and let X ∼ P ⊗n. By a
standard analysis, X contains n distinct elements with probability at least (1− 1
2n3
). Assuming
that this is the case, we have that the first copy of Encrypermute outputs c = m + r mod k!,
wherem encodes the rows of X in positions nα+1, . . . , (1+ α20 ) ·nα , and where r is a deterministic
function of the first nα rows of X. Hence, when composed with M1, these two mechanism
reveal the first (1 + α20 )n
α rows of X. By induction, the output of the composition of all the
copies of EncrypermutewithM1 reveals all of X. Hence, from the output this composition, we
can define the predicate q : {0,1}d → {±1} that evaluates to 1 on every element of X, and to -1
otherwise. This predicate satisfies q(X) = 1 but
q(P ) ≤ −1+ 2n
2d
= −1+ 2
n4
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4.2 Computational Post Hoc Generalization
In this section we consider a computational variant of post hoc generalization, in which we
only require thatM prevents a computationally efficient algorithm from identifying a statistical
query such that the sample and population give very different answers. First we formally
define computational post hoc generalization (after also introducing a technical definition).
Definition 4.4. Let P be a family of distributions over {±1}d . The family is T -sampleable if there
is a randomized algorithmM taking no inputs (e.g. a RAM or circuit) with running time T such
that the output distribution ofM is identical to P .
Definition 4.5 (Computational Post Hoc Generalization). An algorithm M : ({±1}d )n → Y sat-
isfies (n,d,ε,δ,T )-computational post hoc generalization if for every T -sampleable distribution P
over {±1}d and algorithm A running in time T that outputs a bounded function q : {±1}d →
[−1,1], if X ∼ P ⊗n,y ∼M(X), and q ∼ A(y), then
P
X,y,q
[∣∣∣∣∣ Ez∼P [q(z)]− Ez∼X [q(z)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε
]
≤ δ,
where the probability is over the sampling of X and any randomness of M,A. The notation
z ∼ X indicates that z is a uniformly random element of the sample X ∈ X n.
Theorem 4.6. For every α > 0, and every sufficiently large n ∈ N, assuming the existence of an
(nα ,n1.01,n−100,T 100)-pseudorandom generator, there areM1,M2 : ({±1}5logn)n →Y such that
1. for every δ ≥ n−100, both M1 andM2 satisfy (ε,δ,T )-computational post hoc generalization for
ε =O(
√
ln(1/δ)/n.999), but
2. The composition (M1,M2) is not
(
1− 1
n3
,1− 1
n3
,T
)
-computational post hoc generalizing.
We note that the parameters of the assumed pseudorandom generator are somewhat arbi-
trary, and are somewhat irrelevant since we are content to assume pseudorandom generators
with arbitrarily-small-polynomial seed length secure against arbitrarily-large-polynomial time
algorithms. We chose these parameters for simplicity and concreteness. The precise parameters
we need will be clear from the construction.
The proof of Theorem 4.6 is quite similar to that of Theorem 4.1. The main difference is that
the computational assumption allows us to avoid the recursive construction involving O(logn)
algorithms with a faster process involving just two algorithms. Recall that in Encrypermutek
we used the order of the first k elements as a key of length log2(k!) = Θ(k logk). We then used
this random string as a way to encrypt the next Ω(k) elements of the dataset. The bottleneck
is that in the information-theoretic setting we can only encrypt as many bits as the length of
the key, and this meant we needed Ω(logn) rounds to gradually encrypt the entire dataset.
However, using cryptographic assumptions, we can a pseudorandom generator to stretch the
Θ(k logk) random bits into (n − k)d random bits that appear truly random to any computation-
ally bounded algorithm. Then we can use this long key to encrypt the entire rest of the dataset.
A small technical issue is that pseudorandom generators are used to stretch uniformly random
strings, whereas in Encrypermute we are stretching a random number r ∈ {0,1, . . . , k! − 1}, and
k! is not a power of 2. This small gap can be handled using the following fact:
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Fact 4.7. Let N ∈N, and let R be uniform on [N ]. Then the 12 logN least significant bits in the binary
representation of R are almost uniform, with statistical distance at most 1/
√
N .
Proof Sketch. The proof is based on the fact that (no matter how many of the most significant
bits we ignore) the difference in count between different strings is at most 1. If we ignore half
of the bits, the difference in occurrence is between 2
1
2 ·logN and 2
1
2 ·logN+1, which introduces a
statistical distance of at most 2−
1
2 ·logN = 1/
√
N from uniform.
Algorithm 8: PRG-Encrypermutek
Input: Parameter k, and a sample X = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) ∈ ({0,1}d )n for d = 5logn.
Step (1):
If X contains n distinct elements
Let π be the permutation that sorts (x1, . . . ,xk) and identify π with p ∈ {0,1, . . . , k!− 1}
Else
Let p be a random number in {0,1, . . . , k!− 1}
Let s denote the ℓ = k8 logk least significant bits in the binary representation of p.
Step (2):
Compute r← G(s) for a pseudorandom generator G : {0,1}ℓ → {0,1}d(n−k)
Step (3):
Identify xk+1, . . . ,xn ∈ ({0,1}d )n−k with a binary string m ∈ {0,1}d(n−k)
Return c =m⊕ r
Before analyzing the algorithm, we will introduce some notation. For a sample X, let
X[k + 1,n] = (xk+1, . . . ,xn) denote the last (n − k) elements of X. We will break the algorithm
PRG-Encrypermute into three algorithms, M1,M2,M3 corresponding to the three steps. The
first algorithm M1 takes a sample X and outputs s ∈ {0,1}ℓ, the second algorithm M2 takes
s ∈ {0,1}ℓ and outputs G(s) ∈ {0,1}d(n−k), and the third algorithmM3 takes X[k +1,n] and r and
outputs c ∈ {0,1}d(n−k). With this notation,
PRG-Encrypermutek(X) =M3 (X[k +1,n],M2(M1(X)))
Claim 4.8. The algorithm that takes a database X ∈ ({0,1}d )n, samples r ∈ {0,1}d(n−k) uniformly at ran-
dom and runsM3 (X[k +1,n], r), is (ε,δ)-robustly generalizing for every δ > 0 and ε =
√
2ln(2/δ)/n.
Proof Sketch. For every distribution P , the output of the algorithm is independent of the sample
X, so the statement follows from the Hoeffding bound.
Claim 4.9. For every pair of constants α,γ > 0, the algorithm that takes a sample X ∈ ({0,1}d )n,
samples s ∈ {0,1}ℓ uniformly at random and runs M3 (X[k +1,n],M2(s)) with parameter k = nα , is
(ε,δ)-computationally post hoc generalizing for every δ ≥ n−100 and ε =√8ln(8/δ)/n.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that the statement is false. Let P be efficiently samplable
and and A be an efficient algorithms such that such that when we sample X ∼ P ⊗n, s ∈ {0,1}ℓ,
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c←M3 (X[k +1,n],M2(s)), and q←A(c), we have
P
[∣∣∣∣∣ Ez∼P [q(z)]− Ez∼X [q(z)]
∣∣∣∣∣ >√8ln(2/δ)/n
]
> 4δ.
for some δ ∈ (0,1)
We now use P and A in order to construct to the following distinguisher B that contradicts
our assumption thatM2 is a pseudorandom generator.
Algorithm 9: Distinguisher B
Input: Parameter δ ∈ (0,1) and a string r ∈ {0,1}d(n−k)
Sample two independent datasets X,D ∼ P ⊗n
Run A (M3 (X[k +1,n], r)) to obtain a query q : {0,1}d → [−1,1]
Return 1 if |q(X)− q(D)| >√8ln(2/δ)/n and 0 otherwise
First observe that in the algorithm above, q and D are independent, so by the Hoeffding
bound, with probability at least 1− δ we have
|q(D)− q(P )| ≤
√
2ln(2/δ)
n
. (2)
Now, if algorithm B is executed with a uniform string r, then by Claim 4.8 with probability
1 − δ we also have |q(X) − q(P )| ≤ √2ln(2/δ)/n. So, if r is uniform, then the probability that
|q(X)− q(D)| >√2ln(2/δ)/n (i.e. the probability that the algorithm outputs 1) is at most 2δ.
On the other hand, by our assumption towards contradiction, when algorithm B is executed
with a string r that is generated by applying M2 on a uniformly random s ∈ {0,1}ℓ, then the
probability that |q(X)− q(P )| >√8ln(2/δ)/n is at least 4δ. Combined with Inequality (2), we see
that the probability of the algorithm outputting 1 in this case is at least 3δ. This contradicts our
assumption onM2 whenever δ ≥ n−γ .
Claim 4.10. Let D be any distribution over ({0,1}d )n. Let D ∼ D, let X be a permutation of D, and let
s←M1(X). Also let s˜ be uniform on {0,1}ℓ, independent of D. Then for every parameter k,
SD
(
(D,X[k +1,n], s) , (D,X[k +1,n], s˜)
)
≤ k−k/8.
Proof Sketch. Consider p ∈ {0,1,2, . . . , k! − 1} defined in step 1 of PRG-Encrypermutek . Similarly
to Claim 4.2, it holds that p is uniform, and independent of (D,X[k + 1,n]). Therefore s (the
string of length ℓ defined on step 2) is independent of (D,X[k + 1,n]), since it is a function of p
only. We also have that s˜ is independent of (D,X[k + 1,n]) by definition, and hence, the result
follows immediately from Fact 4.7.
Lemma 4.11. For every constant α > 0, the algorithm PRG-Encrypermute with parameter k = nα is
(ε,δ)-computational robustly generalizing for every δ ≥ n−100 and ε =√8ln(16/δ)/n.
Proof. Let δ ≥ n−γ and ε = √8ln(16/δ)/n. Let P be a sampleable distribution over {0,1}d , let
D ∼ P ⊗n, letX be a permutation ofD, and let s←M1(X). Also let s˜ ∈ {0,1}ℓ be chosen uniformly
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at random. Now consider any algorithm A that takes the output of PRG-Encrypermute(X) and
outputs a function q. Our goal is to show that the probability that |q(P )− q(X)| > ε is at most δ.
To that end, recall that we can restateA (PRG-Encrypermutek(X)) as
A
(
M3 (X[k +1,n],M2(M1(X)))
)
Therefore, the event that |q(P )−q(X)| > ε is a function of (D,X[k+1,n], r), and the random coins
of A. Hence, by Claim 4.10, this event happens with roughly the same probability even when
we replace s with the uniform string s˜. In that case, by Claim 4.9, we know that this event
happens with probability at most δ/2.
Theorem 4.6 now follows from the above analysis by composing PRG-Encrypermutek with
the algorithm that outputs the first k elements of its input X ∈ ({0,1}d )n. The analysis is similar
to that of Theorem 4.1.
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